World War II: U.S. Anti-German U-Boat Warfare Academic Research Reports
CD-ROM
2,845 pages of reports, monographs, studies, and historical dissertations dating from 1942 to 2020, related to United States innovations and implementation of anti-submarine warfare against German U-boats during World War II.
The 26 works include:
“An Honorable Place in American Air Power” Civil Air Patrol Coastal Patrol Operations, 1942–1943 (2020)
by Frank A. Blazich Jr., PhD Colonel, CAP
Abstract: On 12 January 1942, five German U-boats started sinking merchant shipping off the Eastern Seaboard of North America. The German offensive, codenamed Paukenschlag (“Drumbeat”), delivered a jarring blow to the American home front and found the nation’s military underequipped and ill prepared to combat the U-boat menace. The Navy’s antisubmarine resources at the onset of the war in December 1941 were extremely limited. Rear Adm Adolphus Andrews, commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier comprising almost 1,500 miles of coastline from the Canadian border with Maine to the southern boundary of Duval County, Florida, could marshal a meager force: 20 under-armed, undermanned ships of varying reliability and a motley assortment of 103 aircraft, three-quarters of which were unsuited for either coastal patrol or antisubmarine defense. A frontier war diary admitted the basic fact at hand: “When we entered the war, we did not have the naval strength required to defend the merchant shipping we needed.”
War in the Atlantic: A Historical Case of Homeland Security (2015)
by Caleb J. Hogg, Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
Abstract: At the outbreak of World War II, Great Britain was unprepared to counter German submarine warfare in the Atlantic. In World War I, Germany had conducted a devastating U-boat campaign against merchant shipping, threatening the Atlantic supply chain that Britain depended on for goods, food, and materiel. The Royal Navy defended the commercial fleet by organizing convoy escorts. In the interwar period, the navy was burdened by a poor economy, interservice rivalry, and a treaty limiting its fleet.
Historian Correlli Barnett points out that the admiralty had warned that the diminished navy was unprepared to face the rising aggression of Japan and Germany in his book Engage the Enemy More Closely, published in 1991 by Norton. When war was declared, the navy immediately resumed the convoys and escorts, but it was not sufficient to protect all routes.
In the end, technological advances, above all the introduction of long-range aircraft in an antisubmarine role, helped offset British unreadiness and concomitant losses in the Atlantic, but ingenuity would not have been enough. Without strategic alliances, Britain could not have gained the upper hand.
Atlantic: A Historical Case of Homeland Security (2015)
Abstract: At the outbreak of World War II, Great Britain was unprepared to counter German submarine warfare in the Atlantic. In World War I, Germany had conducted a devastating U-boat campaign against merchant shipping, threatening the Atlantic supply chain that Britain depended on for goods, food, and materiel. The Royal Navy defended the commercial fleet by organizing convoy escorts. In the interwar period, the navy was burdened by a poor economy, interservice rivalry, and a treaty limiting its fleet.
Historian Correlli Barnett points out that the admiralty had warned that the diminished navy was unprepared to face the rising aggression of Japan and Germany in his book Engage the Enemy More Closely, published in 1991 by Norton. When war was declared, the navy immediately resumed the convoys and escorts, but it was not sufficient to protect all routes.
In the end, technological advances, above all the introduction of long-range aircraft in an antisubmarine role, helped offset British unreadiness and concomitant losses in the Atlantic, but ingenuity would not have been enough. Without strategic alliances, Britain could not have gained the upper hand.
Defeating the U-boat - Inventing Antisubmarine Warfare (2010)
by Jan S. Breemer
A research project paper from the Naval War College.
Abstract: In Defeating the U-boat: Inventing Antisubmarine Warfare, Newport Paper 36, Jan S. Breemer tells the story of the British response to the German submarine threat. His account of Germany’s “asymmetric” challenge (to use the contemporary term) to Britain’s naval mastery holds important lessons for the United States today, the U.S. Navy in particular. The Royal Navy’s obstinate refusal to consider seriously the option of convoying merchant vessels, which turned out to be the key to the solution of the U-boat problem, demonstrates the extent to which professional military cultures can thwart technical and operational innovation even in circumstances of existential threat. Although historical controversy continues to cloud this issue, Breemer concludes that the convoying option was embraced by the Royal Navy only under the pressure of civilian authority. Breemer ends his lively and informative study with some general reflections on military innovation and the requirements for fostering it.
Search Theory and U-Boats in the Bay of Biscay (2003)
by R. Gregory Carl, Captain, USAF
Abstract: Threats to our nations resources and forces are becoming increasingly lethal and mobile. Therefore, our ability to locate and interdict these threats is more important than ever. Search theory is one tool that is vital to countering the increasing threat. This research presents a multi-agent simulation, built around the Allied search for U-boats in the Bay of Biscay during World War II, which extends several classic search theory algorithms. Comparison of techniques is based on the effectiveness of finding high- valued, mobile assets. A JAVA-based multi-agent simulation model is designed, built, and tested, and used to demonstrate the existence of differing emergent behaviors between search patterns currently used by the United States military.
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Cotesworth Slessor and the Anglo-American Air Power Alliance, 1940-1945 (2001)
by Major Corvin J. Connolly
Abstract: Sir John C. Slessor 1897-1979 was one of Great Britain’s most influential airmen of the Second World War. Slessor was also instrumental in defeating the U-boat menace as RAF Coastal Commander, and later shared responsibility for directing Allied air operations in the Mediterranean.
Air Power Versus U-boats: Confronting Hitler’s Submarine Menace in the European Theater (1999)
by A. Timothy Warnock
Abstract: Perhaps one of the least known but significant roles of the Army Air Forces (AAF) was in antisubmarine warfare, particularly in the European-African-Middle Eastern theater. From the coasts of Greenland, Europe, and Africa to the mid-Atlantic, AAF aircraft hunted German U-boats that sank thousands of British and American transport ships early in the war. These missions supplemented the efforts of the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force Coastal Command, and the U.S. Navy, and helped those sea forces to wrest control of the sea lanes from German submarines.
The U-Boat War in the Caribbean: Opportunities Lost (1996)
by Karl M. Hasslinger Commander, United States Navy
Abstract: This paper reviews the specific segments of the Battle of the Atlantic that were conducted in and around the Caribbean Sea. The background information explores Germanys political goals and policies in the years prior to the second world war, and the military situation that resulted. The Battle of the Atlantic is reviewed to determine the reasons for sending U-boats to the Caribbean theater, which was at the effective limit of their operational endurance. Further, the operational art aspects of the use of U-boats in the Caribbean theater and the results they achieved are examined in detail. The subsequent withdrawal of U-boats from the Caribbean after only eleven months in the theater is specifically evaluated in light of the personal leadership and operational art abilities of the Command in Chief of the U-boat Arm, Admiral Karl Doenitz. The papers conclusion is an evaluation of the title question. Despite the acknowledged tactical success of inking 400 merchant ships, with the loss of only seventeen U-boats, the author concluded that tb. Germans did not exploit all available opportunities that may have allowed them to achieve an even greater operational success in the prosecution of the Battle of the Atlantic.
The Wolf Pack Connection: A Comparison of World War II Wolf Packs and Modern Attack Helicopter Tactics (1996)
by Major Stephen A. Ingalls, U.S. Army
Abstract: This study explores a comparison of World War II wolf packs and modern attack helicopter battalions. Descriptions of submarines using continuous employment, an attack helicopter technique, against convoys in the Pacific in 1945, and U-boat commanders describing their boats as hovering, offer at least a superficial relationship. This paper investigates the comparison in more depth using four battlefield mechanics force, target, action, and counteraction. A submarine engagement sequence is developed that offers striking similarity to the way helicopters maneuver against mechanized targets. While both must close with the massed target before employing their missile systems, helicopter forces, more than their submarine counterparts, emphasize long range engagements, employing weapon standoff. History, however, suggests American experience in the Pacific began to demonstrate benefits of more distance submarine engagements. Helicopter forces employ fire and maneuver, more difficult for submarines, which have only marginal speed advantage over their intended targets.
Admiral Karl Doenitz: A Legacy of Leadership (1995)
by Joyce E. King, Commander, Judge Advocate General's United States Navy
Abstract: A study of the operational leadership exhibited by ADM Karl Doenitz, Commander in Chief, Submarines, German Navy, during World War II. An examination of his planning, preparation and conduct of the U-boat war in the Atlantic Theater of Operations against the British, and later, the Americans. His objective of sinking the merchant fleet of the British nearly brought Britain to defeat. He displayed great talent in his dedicated fight for resources, innovative tactics of using wolfpacks, his intentive training program and unique command and control system, of these innovations enabled him to maximize use of his limited resources in the optimum way possible to achieve the strategic and operational objectives in the theater. He was also a master of operational maneuver and shifted his focus and his assets within his theater to take advantage of allied vulnerabilities. His personal character traits served him well as he inspired trust and unparalleled loyalty from his subordinates. His operational thinking and practice of operational art throughout this campaign remain a relevant model of operational leadership.
Operation PAUKENSCHLAG: An Operational Analysis (1994)
by Sean R. Filipowski, Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
Abstract: Operation Paukenschlaq, a German U-boat operation against Allied shipping along the East Coast of the United States and Canada in early 1942, is analyzed from the perspective of the operational level of war. The plan and its execution are examined to provide conclusions and lessons learned for future operational planning considerations. Chapter One provides a short historical summary of the German U-boat Force and the Battle of the Atlantic. Chapter Two analyzes the operational design of Paukenschlaq. Chapter Three discusses the execution of the operation. Finally, Chapter Four offers information from the operation which could be useful for future commanders. This analysis of Operation Paukenschlaq shows that an operation conceived, planned, and executed in as short as time as Paukenschlaq was, can be successful, provided several critical factors prevail.
From the Sea Versus the U-Boat (1994)
by Brian A. Cosgrove LCDR, USN
Abstract: This paper will analyze World War II U-boat operations against Allied sealift with focus on the period from May 1943 to the end of the war. It will show the relevance of the operational and strategic decisions of this historical campaign to the challenges of todays potential regional conflicts. In 1943, Allied technological innovations and convoy employment precipitated a decline in U-boat successes and changes to the final portion of the U-boat campaign produced fewer U-boat victories, yet remained an effective operational scheme. It is relevant that the inability of Allied forces to consistently thwart successful U-boat attacks, along their own coastlines, emphasizes a weakness in our Naval Strategy Today, insufficient, and usually lightly protected sealift. The Navy and Marine Corps joint White Paper, from the Sea, articulates Navy support of the National Security and National Military Strategies of the United States with a commitment to concentrate more on capabilities required in the complex operating environment of the littoral or coastlines of the earth.
The Effects of World War II Submarine Campaigns of Germany and the United States A Comparative Analysis (1994)
by G. H. Pearsali, Commander, Supply Corps, United States Navy
Abstract: The effectiveness of the German and United States submarine campaigns during World War II is compared by analyzing the genesis of each campaign, the commitment to each and the effort to overcome the losses imposed by submarine warfare. This comparison highlights one aspect of the strategic and operational consequences of conflict with an adversary able to build and maintain a superior industrial base in support of the military effort. This analysis places primary focus on German U-boat efforts in the Battle of the Atlantic and the U.S. submarine efforts in the Western Pacific. Ultimately, the overriding factor in the outcomes of both campaigns was the ability of the United States to produce more ships than the Germans could sink, to build more submarines than the Japanese could sink, and to sink more Japanese ships than the Japanese could build. As a result, the United States was able to sustain its' total military effort against Germany; Japan was not able to sustain its efforts in the Pacific.
The Battle Against the U-Boat in the American Theater: December 7, 1941-September 2, 1945 (1994)
by A. Timothy Warnock of the Air Force Historical Research Agency.
Abstract: In 1942, the Allied powers faced the most serious challenge to their control of the seas encountered in the Second World War the menace of the U-boat. Fast, well-armed, and long-ranged, Hitlers submarines attacked shipping zones throughout the North Atlantic, often within sight of Americas coastal towns and cities. Eventually, the combination of intelligence, land, and sea-based air power, and surface vessel operations from both North American and British bases ended this threat, making possible the Allied build-up for the invasion of Europe in 1944. This booklet, by A. Timothy Warnock of the Air Force Historical Research Agency, is one of a series tracing selected Army Air Forces activities in the Second World War. It describes the Army Air Forces contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic from the American Theater. A subsequent booklet will examine the campaign in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Flying radar-equipped, long-range patrol planes, Army Air Force airmen demonstrated the value of land-based air power against naval threats. This success has been reaffirmed consistently since the Second World War, from Vietnam and crises such as the Mayaguez incident to operations in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Harpoon-armed B-52s of our present-day global Air Force are the heirs of a sea-control tradition dating to the Army Air Forces A-29s and B-24s of the Second World War.
Critical German Submarine Operations Versus Allied Convoys During March 1943: An Operational Analysis (1993)
by Brian F. Hussey Jr.
Abstract: Although the United States was officially neutral until 7 December 1941, the U.S. Navy entered World War II on 5 September 1939 when the CNO, Admiral Harold R. Stark, initiated Neutrality Patrol operations in the Caribbean and in waters 200 miles off the coasts of North and South America. During 1940, the Navy conducted battleship sweeps deep into the Atlantic to deter Axis surface raiders and U-boats from entering the Neutrality Zone, and also moved toward a solid Anglo-American alliance, one vehicle being information exchanges between OpNav and the Admiralty. The negotiation of the ABC-1 Agreement in March 1941 increased Anglo-American collaboration. Atlantic Fleet patrols becamb more aggressive and the fleet doubled in size. By September, the Atlantic Fleet's Support Force, in conjunction with the Royal Canadian Navy, was ready to commence escort-of-convoy operations, and that same month, Atlantic Fleet destroyers escorted their first convoy from Halifax to Iceland. A hkndful of convoys were attacked, but the Atlantic Fleet used these experiences to fashion an effective escort-of-convoy doctrine.
The U.S. Navy, the Neutrality Patrol, and Atlantic Fleet Escort Operations, 1939-1941 (1991)
by Bruce E. Grooms LCDR, USN
Abstract: German submarine operations against allied convoys, during M1arch 1943 is critically analyzed from an operational perspective. The theater commander's operational scheme is dissected for the purpose of identifying lessons which can be applied to the planning and execution of today's theater operations. A brief historical account of the early phases of the war and the events and decisions which precer-Id the critical convoy battles will be followed by an analysis of the operational scheme employed by Admiral Doenitz. German victory during the spring offensive clearly demonstrated numerous operational successes, a reasonably well conceived operational plan, and proof positive of the potential for a larger scale victory, yet history recorded Germany's ultimate defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic.
U-Boats in the Bay of Biscay. An Essay in Operations Analysis (1990)
by Brian McCue
Abstract: In this "operations analysis history," a combination of traditional history and analysis employing quantitative techniques, author Brian McCue explores the uses and limits of operations analysis. He takes as his text the 1942-44 campaign against German U-Boats in the North Atlantic, completing the analysis the pioneering WWII researchers never had a chance to finish.
Slide Rules and Submarines: American Scientists and Subsurface Warfare in World War II (1990)
by Montgomery C. Meigs
Abstract: In Slide Rules and Submarines, Montgomery Meigs describes how the Allies learned to counter the U-boat threat. Using new technology—and new tactics derived from scientific methods—they devised countermeasures to defeat the German submarine menace. Then, continuing to apply those successful measures, they went on to negate the Japanese submarine threat in the Pacific. The author cites the crucial role of civilian scientists—the “outsiders”—who worked with military staffs and operational commanders of the campaign at sea. Their open minds and objective methods were essential for the application of such technical advances as sonar and radar, acoustic torpedoes, depth finders, and code breaking to the battle.
Ultra and the Campaign Against the U-Boats in World War II (1980)
by Commander Jerry C. Russell, United States Navy
Abstract: The problem addressed is the extent to which the United States Navy used Ultra, or Special Intelligence, in the campaign against the German U-boats. Information was gathered through published and unpublished sources. Through a chronological approach, United States Navy involvement is traced from entry into the war until its conclusion. Many factors are involved in the final outcome of the war and Ultra is only one. The Battle of the Atlantic was long and gruesome rather than short and spectacular. The United States Navy used Ultra along with technology, tactics, brilliant leadership and courageous men at sea to win the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II. The lessons for the future are clear. If the United States intends to oppose the Soviet submarine force at sea anywhere in the world, then we must maintain the lead in intelligence, tactics and technology. Further, and most importantly, we must strive to regain superiority of forces in those ocean areas where our interests are at stake.
NSA Journal "Studies in Cryptology" Article: Ultra and the Battle of the Atlantic (1977)
Abstract: In the following pages are the texts of three papers on "Ultra and the Battle of the
Atlantic" presented at the Naval Symposium at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis on October 28, 1977. The speakers were Patrick Beesly, former Deputy Chief, Submarine Plotting Room, the Admiralty; Jurgen Rohwer, Director of the Library of Contemporary History, Stuttgart; and Kenneth Knowles, former Head, Atlantic Section, Combat Intelligence, on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet. The session was organized by Professor Harold C. Deutsch of the U.S. Army War College, who served as chairman-and whose article surveying the impact bf Ultra on World War II history appears following the three papers.
Effects on U-Boat Performance of Intelligence from Decryption of Allied Communication (1954)
Abstract: Examination of the War Diary of the German ComSubs has made it possible to estimate the character and extent of intelligence obtained by the decryption of Allied radio messages pertaining to convoy operations in the North Atlantic during World War II, and to determine the effect of such intelligence on the capability of the U-Boats to contact convoys and sink ships. It is estimated that the availability of timely usable decryption intelligence increased the contact rate twofold over that which they would have obtained without it probably over 60 sinkings in excess of the expected number if they had been deprived of decryption intelligence. These calculations help in estimating a valid measure of the effectiveness of current and future submarines in anti-convoy operations when decryption intelligence is not available.
Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II (1946)
Created by the Operations Evaluation Group, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1946. Manuscript and illustrations for this volume were prepared for publication by the Summary Reports Group of the Columbia University Division of War Research under contract OEMsr-1131 with the Office of Scientific Research and Development. This volume was printed and bound by the Columbia University Press.
Abstract: This volume embodies the results of some of the A statistical and analytical work done during the period 1942-45 by members of the Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Research Group of the U. S. Navy, later the Operations Research Group and, since September 1945, the Operations Evaluation Group. The group was formed and financed by the Office of Scientific Research and Development at the request of the Navy and was assigned to the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
A Summary of Antisubmarine Warfare Operations in World War II (1946)
A history of antisubmarine operations and antisubmarine measures and their effectiveness. Manuscript and illustrations for this volume were prepared for publication by the Summary Reports Group of the Columbia University Division of War Research under contract OEMsr-1131 with the Office of Scientific Research and Development. This volume was printed and bound by the Columbia University Press.
Abstract: This volume on antisubmarine warfare [ASW] represents a compromise between two major aims, to produce a unified summary of the events and problems of the antisubmarine war on the one hand, and to illustrate the scientific evaluation of naval operations on the other. The approach is fundamentally historical on both accounts, however, since the illustrations of scientific evaluation are taken from various analyses and studies made in connection with antisubmarine warfare during World War II. Great care should therefore be exercised in making predictions concerning the future of ASW from it. There is no guarantee that the antisubmarine measures successful in the past will continue to be adequate in the future.
A Survey of Subsurface Warfare in World War II (1946)
Manuscript and illustrations for this volume were prepared for publication by the Summary Reports Group of the Columbia University Division of War Research under contract OEMsr-1131 with the Office of Scientific Research and Development. This volume was printed and bound by the Columbia University Press.
Abstract: In two world wars the submarine has demonstrated its deadly effectiveness. It cannot be repeated too often nor with too great emphasis that the margin of Allied victory over the U-boat in both wars was narrow and precarious and that the U-boat emerged from the recent war potentially more dangerous than at the beginning. Had the Nazis been a little more imaginative, had their leaders better exploited the scientific and technical skills at their command to anticipate by six months or a year the service use of new submarine types which were under development or just completed when the war was already lost, the outcome might well have been different. For these new type submarines would have rendered obsolete much of the Allied antisubmarine equipment and tactics.
United States Submarine Losses, World War II (1946)
by Naval History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Reissued edition with an appendix of Axis submarine losses, fully indexed.
Abstract: The submarines paid heavily for their successes in World War II. A total of 52 submarines were lost, with 374 officers and 3,131 enlisted men. These personnel losses represented 16%of the officer and 13% of the enlisted operational personnel. Of the 52 losses, two submarines, DORADO and R-12, were lost in the Atlantic, S-26 was sunk in a collision off Panama and S-28 was an operational loss in training at Pearl Harbor. The remaining 48 were lost either directly or indirectly as the result of enemy action, or due to stranding on reefs during combat operations. S-39, S-36, S-27 and DARTER were lost as the result of such strandings. In all these strandings all personnel were rescued.
The A-B-C's of Anti-Submarine Warfare (1942)
Created by the Naval Research Lab Washington DC.
Abstract: The present report attempts to avoid all wishful thinking that tends to blind us to the true status of our war against the U-boats. Some measure of success is attained through the application of a simple relation between the percent of U-boats that are attacked, the percent of the attacks that result in kills and the percent of U-boats that must be destroyed to assure victory. The conclusion is reached that we are losing the present anti-submarine war by such a large margin that measures should be immediately taken to outline, codify, and put into action a more effective anti-submarine program. The report then presents a new anti-submarine procedure.
